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SURROGATE MOTHER AGREEMENTS: CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL ASPECTS OF A BIBLICAL NOTION
Behold now, the Lord prevented me from bearing children: Go into my
maid; it may be that I shall obtain children by her. And Abram harkened to
the voice of Sarah.1
After centuries of silence, modern man again harkens the voice of Sa-
rah. With the decline in the number of children available for adoption2
and the apparent rise in infertility in this country over the past three
decades,3 individuals unable to bear children are seeking alternative
methods for becoming parents.4 Surrogate motherhood is one solution to
the age old problem of childless families. A surrogate mother is a woman,
married or unmarried,5 who agrees to have a child for a person who is
incapable of giving birth. While the more common utilization of a surro-
gate occurs in situations where the wife in a married couple is unable to
have a child, it may also occur where an unmarried male seeks to become
a father.6 The surrogate contracts to conceive the child of the husband or
1. Genesis 16:2 (Modern Bible).
2. Passage of liberal abortion laws coupled with greater reliance on birth control methods
has resulted in fewer children being born. Increased social tolerance of illegitimate children
has also encouraged more unmarried females to keep their infants. Bodenheimer, New
Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S.
CAL. L. REv. 10, 13 (1975).
3. Over 10 million men and women between 18 and 40 years old experience procreative
difficulty. Three decades ago one out of ten couples was unable to have children. Today this
figure has increased to one out of six couples. Several reasons for this decline in fertility
have been suggested. Changing lifestyles have caused many couples to postpone child-bear-
ing to a time beyond their peak years of fertility. Also, the increased incidence of venereal
disease has left more people sterile. Finally, certain commonly used methods of birth control
are cuspected of contributing to infertility. Kleiman, Anguished Seek Cure for Infertility,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 9, at 38, col. 1.
4. While artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization are the substitutes now available
for human conception, techniques such as cloning, parthenogenesis, and embryo transfer
may be perfected in the foreseeable future. See generally Green, Genetic Technology: Law
and Policy For the Brave New World, 48 IND. L. J. 559 (1973); Kindregan, State Power
Over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401 (1972); Kinney, Legal
Issues of the New Reproductive Technologies, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 514 (1977); Oakley, Test
Tube Babies: Proposals for Legal Regulation of New Methods of Human Conception and
Prenatal Development, 8 FAM. L.Q. 385 (1974); Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code:
Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEo. L.J. 697 (1976); Note, Asexual Reproduction and
Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 476 (1974).
5. To minimize the likelihood that a surrogate will elect to keep the child, the ideal surro-
gate will already have children. Quindlen, Surrogate Mothers: A Controversial Solution to
Infertility, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1980, § 2, at 6, col. 1.
6. This article will not address the instances in which unmarried couples, homosexual
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single male by means of artificial insemination in return for expenses and,
usually, a fee. The surrogate also agrees that at the child's birth she will
terminate her rights to the child and give custody to the biological father.
If the contract involves a couple, the wife then adopts her husband's
child.
Although a surrogate mother arrangement may offer advantages over
adoption," it is an area fraught with legal questions. With only limited
case law8 and no statutory guidance available on surrogate transactions,
the perimeters of the legal questions involved and the validity of any pro-
posed answers remain unclear. Until appropriate legislation is adopted or
case precedent is established, direction must be sought from existing laws
governing such areas as contracts, artificial insemination, and adoption.
Due consideration must also be given to relevant constitutional limita-
tions. Unfortunately, the task is similar to the proverbial placing of
square pegs in round holes. Contract law is more at home in the business
world than in the nursery; artificial insemination statutes were designed
to legitimize, not bastardize, a child; and adoption procedures were estab-
lished to facilitate giving up an unwanted child rather than to orchestrate
its conception. The law in these substantive areas is simply not designed
to meet the needs of surrogate agreements. In an attempt to clarify the
issues resulting from such incongruities, this comment will examine the
impact of existing laws and constitutional principles on the validity and
enforceability of surrogate transactions. It will also discuss relevant provi-
sions of Virginia law.
couples, or single females contract with a surrogate in order to procure an infant.
7. Among the advantages offered by surrogate mothers is that the infant is the husband's
biological child. Also, the prospective couple does not have to meet the adoption agency
criteria or wait three to seven years for a child. See Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66
CALIF. L. REv. 611 (1978).
8. To date only three cases involving surrogate mother agreements have been filed in the
United States. Doe v. Kelley, - Mich. App. -, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) (declaratory judgment
finding state adoption statute limiting payment of fees was applicable to surrogate agree-
ments). See also Silberg, Circuit Judge Hears Surrogate Mother Case, 105 N.J.L.J. 24, col
4, (Feb. 14, 1980); Court Bars Surrogate Adoptions, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1981, § 1, at 20, col.
6. A paternity-custody suit, In the Matter of James Noyes, was brought in the California
Superior Court by a biological father against a surrogate who refused to give up the child.
The case was eventually settled out of court with the father's name being placed on the
birth certificate of the child. Visitation rights were denied. See Granelli, Surrogate Mother
Sued Over Custody Agreement, 3 NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 4, col. 3; Baby's Father Agrees
to Withdraw His Suit Over Surrogate Birth, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1981, § 1, at 12, coL 1.
The Attorney General of Kentucky has filed a declaratory judgment suit against Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc., a medical clinic that matches couples and surrogates, for alleged
violations of state adoption statutes forbiding the payment of fees for procurement of a
child for the purpose of adoption. Castillo, Kentucky Attorney General Calls Surrogate
Motherhood Illegal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1981, § 3, at 9, col. 1.
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I. BASIC CONTRACT PRINCIPLES AND SURROGATE AGREEMENTS
Once a surrogate has been located, a contract is signed by all parties.'
If each individual honors the agreement, then the law remains silent and
aloof. However, in surrogate contracts, more than in other types of con-
tracts, there is a substantial likelihood that disputes between the parties
will occur. One reason is that surrogate agreements require making per-
sonal choices and commitments months in advance of performance. The
time lapse itself is conducive to participants changing their minds.10
Changed circumstances, such as divorce, illness, death, or even marriage,
may cause either party to attempt a modification or termination of the
contract. Further, a child before being conceived is an unknown entity. It
may be born with physical or mental defects and the prospective parents
accordingly might refuse to take custody of the child. Even more. realistic
is the possibility that once the child is born, the mother may be unwilling
to relinquish custody to the biological father.11
If any such breach of the agreement occurs the first legal question
raised would be the validity and enforceability of the surrogate contract.
Under traditional contract law, there is an adequate basis for finding the
agreement void and unenforceable.1 2 An agreement is illegal and, there-
fore, unenforceable "if either its formations or performance is criminal,
tortious or otherwise opposed to public policy."1 s Thus, surrogate agree-
ments theoretically could be challenged on the grounds that they involve
the crime of adultery,' violate adoption laws,15 circumvent artificial in-
semination statutes, ' or offend the thirteenth amendment. 17 Such con-
tracts could also be found to violate public policy, which "can be enunci-
ated by the Constitution, the legislature or the courts at any time.
Whether there is a prior expression or not, the courts can refuse to en-
force any contract which they deem to be contrary to the best interests of
citizens as a matter of public policy." 8 Because the courts have broad
9. Some surrogate contracts are twelve-line "statements of understanding" that simply
outline the arrangement and provide for relinquishment of legal custody of the child to the
biological father. Others are twenty-page contracts which address a multitude of issues, in-
cluding what will occur if the surrogate decides to keep the child, the father dies, or an
abortion is sought. Marcus, The Baby Maker, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 17, col. 3.
10. Comment, supra note 7, at 619.
11. See Granelli, supra note 8.
12. There appears to be general accord that surrogate agreements would be unenforce-
able. Noel Keane, an attorney who handles surrogate agreements, has expressed such a be-
lief. Marcus, supra note 9. Sanford Katz, Chairman of the ABA Family Law Section agrees.
Quindlen, supra note 5, at 6, col. 2.
13. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932).
14. See notes 45-50 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 81-97 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 36-63 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 73-80 infra and accompanying text.
18. Anaconda Fed. Credit Union 4401 v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178, 483 P.2d 909, 911
4691982]
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discretion to interpret public policy, its seems clear that surrogate con-
tracts may be held unenforceable whenever a court finds that such agree-
ments do not serve the best interests of the citizenry.
The question then becomes what remedies may be pursued if the con-
tract is declared void by the court or is breached by one of the parties.19
If a contract is found void, neither party can sue for breach or recover
losses.2 0 In a surrogate case, the two biological parents would be left to
battle over custody, support, and visitation rights in a separate court pro-
ceeding.21 If the contract were valid, but breached, the nonbreaching
party might seek specific performance. However, in surrogate contracts,
as in all personal service contracts, courts would not grant specific per-
formance, based on several policy considerations. 22 First, actual perform-
ance of a personal service contract would be difficult for a court to super-
vise. Second, to force individuals to perform personal services might
violate the thirteenth amendment by imposing involuntary servitude. Fi-
nally, courts are reluctant to force individuals into unwanted personal as-
sociation.22 The very personal nature of the agreements in question make
these considerations particularly applicable to surrogate cases.
As both a practical and a legal matter, it is even more unlikely that a
court would order a reluctant surrogate to undergo artificial insemination,
submit to an abortion, bear a child, or give up an infant merely because
the terms of a contract require it. If neither a husband2 4 nor the state
2 5
has an interest sufficient to compel an individual to make particular
choices relating to conception and abortion, it is unlikely that mere par-
ties to a contract would have the right to affect such choices. In addition,
a court, ever mindful of the best interests of the child,28 would not force a
reluctant person to take the infant into his life solely because a clause of
(1971). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 369 (1932).
19. For an overview of contract remedies law, see Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach
of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1970).
20. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22-3 (1977); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS §§ 598, 607 (1932).
21. See Granelli, supra note 8; Baby's Father Agrees to Withdraw His Suit Over Surro-
gate Breach, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1981, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
22. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 368, 371, 379 (1932).
23. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, at § 16-5; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
371 (1932).
24. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (woman's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy not subject to parental or spousal consent).
25. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state has sufficient interest to regulate abortion
procedures only after third trimester of pregnancy).
26. In custody and adoption cases courts are very concerned with the best interests of the
child. See, e.g., Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 253 S.E.2d 658 (1979); Malpass v. Morgan, 213
Va. 393, 192 S.E.2d 794 (1972); Dyer v. Howell, 212 Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 789 (1971). See
generally Comment, Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the
Child, 14 J. FAM. L. 547 (1975-76); Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natu-
ral Parents in Child Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446 (1976).
[Vol. 16:467
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a contract so stipulated.
The only real remedy for breach of the surrogate contract would be
damages. If the surrogate failed to comply with the agreement, the biolog-
ical father could seek to recover expenses and fees already paid.27 Any
greater recovery would require a showing of additional economic loss.
2 8 If
the couple breached, the surrogate could sue on the contract for her ex-
penses and promised fee.29 If she could show that the breach was willful
and wanton, and that the promisor had reason to know that any breach
would cause her mental suffering, for reasons other than the pecuniary
loss, recovery for emotional distress might be allowed.30
There may also be remedies available under non-contract theories. An
action for damages based on intentional infliction of emotional distress
could perhaps be brought in tort law.3 1 The mother might elect to put the
child up for general adoption. In a California case where the surrogate
refused to surrender custody of the child, an out of court settlement re-
quired that the biological father's name be placed on the birth certifi-
cate.3 2 Assuming that the paternity of the child could be established, po-
tential suits exist for custody, support, and visitation rights.3 3 In this
regard surrogate cases may be analogous to the New Jersey case of C.M.
v. C.C.,34 where the male friend of an unmarried woman assisted in the
planning of a child and even provided the sperm used for artificial insem-
ination. After the child was born, the mother refused to allow the biologi-
cal father to establish a relationship with the infant. Citing the sperm
donor's participation in the planning of the child, the reasonableness of
his belief that he would be a part of the infant's life, and the thought that
a child should have two parents, the court allowed the father visitation
rights. It also provided that he should contribute to the support and
maintenance of the child.33
II. ISSUES PRESENTED BY ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND ILLEGITIMACY
Equally unresolved issues are raised by the use of artificial insemina-
27. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333 (1932); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note
20, at §§ 15-3, -4.
28. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 819 (1973).
29. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 332 (1932); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, at
§ 14-4.
30. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932). Types of contracts where this has been
applied are engagements to marry, contracts for the carriage or proper disposition of dead
bodies, and contracts for delivery of death messages. Surrogate cases may be analogous to
these situations.
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 312-313 (1965).
32. See N.Y. Times, supra note 21.
33. Id. See also C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977).
34. 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977).
35. Id. at 164, 377 A.2d at 825.
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tion as the method for achieving conception in surrogate transactions. Le-
gal aspects of this procedure have only recently been addressed. 6 To
date, nineteen states have passed statutes regulating artificial insemina-
tion.3 7 The primary purpose of these enactments has been to legitimate
children born as a result of the procedure."' However, it is unclear
whether the statutes were intended to regulate all uses of the method. If
total regulation is intended, surrogate agreements must be careful to com-
ply with statutory requirements in this area. In Virginia, this would mean
that a surrogate must be married and have the consent of her husband
before artificial insemination could be performed by a licensed physi-
cian." Of the states with applicable statutes, only one would allow the
procedure to be perfomed on an unmarried woman. 40 As a practical mat-
ter, physicians in most states would probably not inseminate a single fe-
male on the ground that such action would be contrary to the best inter-
est of the child. 1 Since artificial insemination is a relatively simple
procedure, the parties to a surrogate agreement might be tempted to pro-
ceed without the aid of a physician.42 Self-insemination would violate the
statutes of Virginia and ten other states.43 However all states could deem
36. Although the first artificial insemination of humans occurred in 1799, it was not until
the twentieth century that the procedure began to gain acceptance. Today it is estimated
that 250,000 persons alive in the United States were conceived by this method. Comment,
Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems Presented by the Test Tube Baby, 28 EM-
ORY L.J. 1045, 1047 (1979) [hereinafter Artificial Human Reproduction]. See also Shaman,
Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331 (1979-80); Smith, Through A
Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 132 (1968);
Comment, Artificial Insemination: Problems, Policies, and Proposals, 26 ALA. L. REV. 120
(1973) [hereinafter Artificial Insemination]; Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Ar-
tificial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 859.
37. ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); CAL. CIv. CODE §
7005 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-
69(f) (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE § 74-101.1
(1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1977); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West 1981); MD. EST.
& TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-6-106 (1979); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49 A-1 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 6 (551)-(552) (West 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (1977); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN.
tit. 2, § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1978).
38. Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction, supra note 36, at 1065.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
40. OR. REV. STAT. § 677.365 (1979) (states "if she is married, then need prior written
request and consent of her husband" (emphasis added)).
41. Shaman, supra note 36, at 345.
42. The technique basically consists of inserting a syringe into the vagina and squirting
semen toward the uterine opening. See Shaman, supra note 36, at 333. Self-insemination
was used in the case of C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977).
43. ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1980); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 545-69g(b) (West Supp. 1980); GA.
CODE § 74-101.1 (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-6-106 (1979); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
73 (McKinney 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (West Supp. 1979); VA. CODE ANN.
472 [Vol. 16:467
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such action practicing medicine without a license.44
Another legal question raised by the use of artificial insemination is
whether it constitutes sexual intercourse sufficient to sustain a criminal
charge of adultery or fornication. The general consensus is that adultery
requires some penetration of the female by the male sex organ.45 Yet,
where artificial insemination is involved a more imaginative interpreta-
tion has been accepted by several courts.46 The Canadian decision of
Orford v. Orford47 is most illustrative. In that case artificial insemination
was found to constitute adultery because reproductive powers and facili-
ties had voluntarily been surrrendered to another. 48 A more realistic view
was expressed by the California Supreme Court in People v. Sorenson.
49
The court observed that at the time of artificial insemination, the donor
may be miles away or even dead. Therefore, to suggest that artificial in-
semination involved an illicit affair or sexual intercourse associated with
adultery was "patently absurd." 50
A more serious problem with surrogate agreements arises from the fact
that the statutes and case law which have evolved to regulate artificial
insemination were designed to meet needs entirely different from those
involved in surrogate transactions. Artificial insemination originally was
developed to allow a wife to have her biological child when her husband
was unable to father an infant. The sperm for insemination was furnished
by an anonymous donor who had no actual or potential contact with the
couple or child.51 Because of a mantle of secrecy and, often, medical
fiction, the infant was accepted as the biological child of the couple with-
§ 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1978).
44. Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 N.W.
U.L. REv. 777, 796 (1970).
45. 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 24 (1966).
46. See, e.g., Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (1963);
Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S. 14981 (Super. Ct. of Cook Cty., IM., Dec. 13, 1954), appeal
dismissed, 12 IM. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
47. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
48. Id. at 258.
49. 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
50. Id. at 286, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13. Accord, H. CLARK, LAw OF DomsSTIc
RELATIONS § 12.2 at 329 (1968); Smith, supra note 36, at 134-40; Note, supra note 36, at
874-75. In addition, if a divorce were sought on the basis of adultery by artificial insemina-
tion, a defense of connivance or condonation would be available if the spouse consented to
the procedure. H. CLARK, supra, § 12.2 at 329.
51. This article concerns only artificial insemination with sperm from a known donor.
Most insemination procedures involve sperm from an unknown donor. Two other types of
procedures are sometimes used, however. The first involves artificial insemination using
sperm of the husband of the woman inseminated (AIH). In the other procedure, sperm from
the anonymous donor and the husband are mixed (AIC). The latter method allows the ra-
tionalization that perjury is not committed when the husband's name is placed on the
child's birth certificate. See Shaman, supra note 36, at 332.
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out the necessity of formal adoption by the husband.5 2 True paternity
was only brought to light when the husband, in an effort to circumvent an
obligation for support of the child, disclaimed paternity based on concep-
tion by artificial insemination. 3 Occasionally, paternity would be raised
by the wife to foreclose visitation of the child by the husband" or to dis-
pense with the necessity of his approval for the infant's adoption by her
subsequent husband.55
In an effort to end such disputes, statutes have been passed in nineteen
states which legitimate children conceived by artificial insemination and
establish paternity in the husband, rather than in the unknown donor.5 6
In Virginia the law declares that if the procedural aspects of the statute
are followed, any resulting child "shall be presumed, for all purposes, the
legitimate natural child of such woman and such husband the same as a
natural child not conceived by means of artificial insemination. '5 7 Some
states have taken the additional step of severing all potential obligations
and ties between the donor and the child. In these states, the donor is
treited in law as if he were not the natural father of the child.55 As a
result of such statutory provisions and accompanying case law, the parties
to a surrogate agreement may encounter difficult problems in establishing
paternity.
Application of a statute such as Virginia's to a surrogate case would
indicate that the husband of a married surrogate, not the sperm donor,
would be recognized as the child's father. In a state with the additional
provisions noted above, the donor would have no legal rights to the child,
regardless of actual paternity. If the surrogate refused to relinquish cus-
tody of the child at birth, the biological father might be precluded from
challenging paternity since he would lack standing.5 9 Even if he were al-
lowed to assert his claim, the court might apply estoppel to protect the
child from being bastardized.0 If, on the other hand, the biological father
breached the agreement and refused to take custody of the child upon
52. Id. See also Oakley, supra note 4, at 390, n.47.
53. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964); Gursky v. Gursky, 39
Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963).
54. See, e.g., People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1958);
Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948).
55. See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973).
56. See note 37 supra.
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
58. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(b) (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1977);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 40-6-106(2)
(1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.243 (1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 12.03(b) (Vernon
1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103(b) (1978).
59. Comment, Artificial Insemination, supra note 36, at 124.
60. Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction, supra note 36, at 1076. See, e.g., People
ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 263-64, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183 (1958).
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birth, the child would be presumed to be the child of the surrogate and
her husband. The statutory provisions noted above probably would bar
the couple from asserting any rights against the biological father.
The obstacles are not entirely removed by the absence of artificial in-
semination statutes. Many states still recognize Lord Mansfield's pre-
sumption that a child born during a marriage is presumed to be that of
the husband. 1 In addition, while the case law involving artificial insemi-
nation deals primarily with support obligations by the husband, it is clear
that the courts view him as the child's legal father. As the California
court reasoned in People v. Sorenson, the husband is the legal father be-
cause a child conceived by artificial insemination does not have a natural
father.62 A similar view was echoed in In Re Adoption of Anonymous." In
that case a New York court found that a husband could not adopt his
wife's child conceived by artificial insemination during her former mar-
riage without the former husband's consent.
The next legal question is presented when the mother, in accordance
with the agreement, places the biological father's name on the birth cer-
tificate. Assuming, arguendo, that this is sufficient to counteract the arti-
ficial insemination statutes, the child is then born out of wedlock and,
thus, illegitimate.6 Aside from the stigma of such a label, the greatest
consequences would be in the area of inheritance. While Blackstone
would find that such a child could inherit from no one,65 more modern
laws allow the infant to inherit from both his mother and his putative
father if certain requirements are met.6 In Virginia, public recognition of
the child by the father or his consent to the placement of his name on the
birth certificate would be sufficient to allow the child to inherit from
him.6
7
An even greater problem involves determining when the child's right to
61. H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 5.3 at 169; Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by Arti-
ficial Insemination, 5 J. FAze. L. 39 (1965).
62. 68 Cal. 2d at 282, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
63. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973).
64. See H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 5.1 at 156; Lee, The Changing American Law Relat-
ing to Illegitimate Children, 11 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 415, 416 (1975).
65. "The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot be heir to
anyone, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body;, for being nullius filius, he is there-
fore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be de-
rived." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CovmmENrus* 459.
66. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2); Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAu.
L.Q. 1, 7-8 (1974); Schwartz, Rights of a Father with Regard to His Illegitimate Child, 36
OHio ST. L.J. 1, 15 n.73 (1975).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(2)(b), -5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1980). In recent years the United
States Supreme Court has acted to remove the stigma of illegitimacy. Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977) (Court held that state could not categorically deny right of an illegiti-
mate child to inherit by intestate succession from father). Cf. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978) (states may require certain forms of proof of paternity).
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inherit from the surrogate mother would be terminated. As long as the
child is not adopted, inheritance through the surrogate would be possible.
In addition, both the Uniform Probate Code68 and the Code of Virginia
provide that "adoption of a child by the spouse of a biological parent has
no effect on the relationship between the child and either biological par-
ent." 69 As a result, the child would be able to inherit from the biological
father, the surrogate, and the adoptive mother. The child could also in-
herit from the surrogate's family line.70 Of course, by having a will, the
surrogate could negate the effect of such provisions for intestate
succession. 1
III. ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PAYMENT OF CONSIDERATION
Further legal problems may be generated by the payment of expenses
and fees to a surrogate mother. 2 Monetary transactions relating to the
procurement of a child must conform to the requirements of the thir-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution and of public pol-
icy. If adoption is involved, one must also be alert to restrictions posed by
adoption statutes.
The thirteenth amendment assures that "neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude... shall exist within the United States .... ."3 Despite
the origins of this amendment as a response to slavery after the Civil
War,7 4 it has been suggested that the provision has a potential application
to surrogate mother agreements.7 5 However, surrogate transactions proba-
bly could not be construed as violating the express language of the
amendment. It has long been recognized that involuntary servitude does
not apply to the rights of parents to the custody of their minor children.76
Therefore, the placement of an infant with its biological father would not
appear to constitute involuntary servitude. While money changes hands
in both situations, the welcoming of an infant into the father's "family
fold" lacks the evil connotations normally associated with any form of
68. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(1) (Repl. Vol. 1980).
70. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(2) (Repl. Vol. 1980); Johnson, Inheritance Rights of
Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 275, 281-84 (1978).
71. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-101, -604.
72. Some surrogates accept only medical expenses while others collect fees for their ser-
vices. Total expenditures generally range from $5000 to $10,000 but may be as high as
$20,000. See Granelli, supra note 8, at 4, col. 2.
73. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
74. For a discussion of the origins of the amendment, see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
75. Letter from Gregory M. Luce, Assistant Virginia Attorney General, to Jeff Krause,
Esq. (Dec. 10, 1980). While stating that Virginia law did not forbid payment of considera-
tion to a surrogate, the letter suggested that the thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights
Act might apply.
76. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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slavery.
While the letter of the thirteenth amendment is not violated by surro-
gate agreements, its spirit may be compromised. This spirit has been ar-
ticulated as the belief that "the sovereign has an interest in a minor child
superior even to that of the parents; hence, there is a public policy
against the custody of such child becoming the subject of barter."77
Courts have applied this public policy in recognizing as "fundamental
that parents may not barter and sell their children. 7 8 While a strict ap-
plication of this policy could foreclose payment to a surrogate, the policy
does not appear to be etched in stone. Exceptions have been noted when
the consideration accompanies a change of custody from one relative to
another. When the motivating factor is not pecuniary gain but the best
interest of the child, courts have found such agreements to be "family
compacts"" that do not violate public policy.79 In surrogate agreements
payments could also be viewed as the biological father's attempt to pro-
tect the welfare of his child by insuring that the mother is provided with
proper care. Further indications that the ban against payment is not ab-
solute exist in statutory acknowledgement that in adoption proceedings
expenses during confinement may be made out of a sense of charity.80
Although the law varies from state to state, it is widely held that adop-
tion statutes authorize payment for expenses relating to the adoption pro-
cess."" Virginia merely requires notification to the court having jurisdic-
tion in the matter of payments made to the person or agency assisting in
obtaining a child. 2 However, most states require approval by the court of
all expenses.8 3 Generally, payment of medical and legal expenses is
deemed proper." A number of states also have a restriction which limits
payment of additional consideration by providing that "except charges
and fees approved by the court, a person shall not offer, give or receive
any money or other consideration or thing of value in connection [with]
... placing a child for adoption. . .a release. . .[or] a consent .... ,,85
77. 6 S. WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1744A (rev. ed. 1936).
78. In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 323, 350 P.2d 1, 11 (1960).
79. Id. at 324, 340 P.2d at 12; Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir.
1975).
80. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 273(a).
81. H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 18.6 at 651.
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-223(d)(7) (Repl. Vol. 1980).
83. See, e.g., ARiz. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (1956); CAL. Crv. CODE § 224r (West Supp.
1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAws § 710.54 (West Supp.
1981).
84. Letter from Michigan Judge James H. Lincoln to Margaret Pfeiffer (Mar. 2, 1977).
85. MICH. Cohip. LAws ANN. § 710.54 (Supp. 1981). See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 273 (West
Supp. 1976); COLO. REv. STAT. § 2A: 96-7 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 96-7 (West 1969);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866(1) (Supp. 1981). It is
ironic that consideration may not be allowed in surrogate cases where the mother must en-
dure the physical discomfort and restraints of pregnancy, yet sperm donors who suffer no
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Taken literally, such statutes would preclude payment to the surrogate of
any extra fees, including the value of wages lost during disability due to
pregnancy and child-birth.88 Despite indications that such statutes should
not be applied outside the context of normal adoption procedures,8 7 both
the Kentucky Attorney Generals and a Michigan Court of Appeals"9 have
found similar statutory restrictions applicable to surrogate agreements.
Such a broad construction of these restrictions may be questionable in
view of the original purpose of laws limiting the payment of consideration
in adoptions. When such legislation was enacted, surrogate mothers were
unknown. The object of the provisions was to protect both mother and
child from unscrupulous persons engaged in the booming black market
baby business.90 The prey of such practices was usually an unplanned,
unwanted, and often illegitimate child. Unable to perceive any better al-
ternative and acting under the duress of the situation, the mother was
induced to give up her baby for money.91 Without concern for the welfare
of either the mother or infant, the child then became available to the
highest bidder.
Surrogate agreements do not fit into the black market proffle. In the-
ory, there is no unwanted pregnancy, no duress, no hurried decision and
no rival bidding. Before a child is conceived, each party makes an inde-
pendent decision to enter an agreement to have a child. Since the agree-
ment is made prior to artificial insemination, any payment might be
physical consequences are regularly paid. Such payment ranges from $20 to $35 per donor.
Curie-Cohen, Luttress & Shapiro, Current Practices of Artificial Insemination by Donor in
the United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MaN. 585, 587 (1979).
86. Judge Lincoln of Michigan explicitly stated that he would not allow the payment of
lost wages in a surrogate adoption case. See note 84 supra.
87. The prevailing view in many jurisdictions is that adoption statutes should be given a
construction that is reasonable and carries out the intent of the legislature. Since surrogate
agreements were not within the contemplation of the legislature at the time the statutes
were adopted, they should not be applied to these agreements. 2 AM. JR. 2D ADOPIION § 5
(1981).
88. In response to a request by two Louisville newspapers, Kentucky Attorney General
Steven L. Beshear wrote a seven-page advisory opinion in which he concluded that state
laws regulating the payment "for the procurement of a child for adoption," make surrogate
agreements illegal. He has filed a suit for declaratory judgment to clarify this issue. Castillo,
supra note 8.
89. Doe v. Kelly, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981). The court found that stat-
utes precluding the payment of consideration in adoption cases were applicable to surrogate
cases. The court further noted that this did not mean surrogate agreements were illegal, but
only that one could not pay fees or expenses over those normally allowed in other adoption
proceedings.
90. See generally Grove, Independent Adoption: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 VML.
L. REv. 116 (1967); Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption
Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547 (1975); Note, Black-Market Adoption, 22 CATH. L. 48 (1976);
Note, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715
(1950).
91. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 14-16.
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viewed merely as consideration to the mother for the inconvenience of
pregnancy and childbirth, rather than as purchase of a child.92 It may also
be argued that compensation for lost wages is not payment to procure a
child, but rather is a means of allowing the surrogate to maintain her
financial status quo.9 3 In addition, the interests of the child arguably are
protected in that he will enter the home of the biological father.
Adoption statutes place other legal obstacles in the path of surrogate
arrangements. For instance, in Virginia "the consent of a parent for the
adoption of his or her child shall not be valid unless the child be at least
ten days old at the time the consent is signed."", Since a surrogate agree-
ment is signed prior to conception, it would not be a valid consent to
adoption. Statutes in other states forbid the use of advertising to seek
children available for adoption.95 Women willing to act as surrogate
mothers are often found through advertisements. If such laws are applica-
ble to surrogate transactions, they are likely to impede the location of
surrogates. Another problem is created by the participation of doctors,
lawyers, and other persons not licensed to place children for adoption in
arranging surrogate adoptions. In Virginia, as in other states, "the utiliza-
tion of an attorney or physician in locating and effecting the move of a
child from the surrogate mother to the natural father and his lawful
spouse would be the type of activity which requires licensure." e Strict
compliance with this requirement would mean that doctors or lawyers
could not actively assist in arranging surrogate agreements. However, the
policy behind the licensure requirement arose without reference to chil-
dren born of surrogate mothers. In addition, the intermediary's efforts are
aimed primarily at locating and overseeing the use of a surrogate rather
than placing a child for adoption.97
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs RAISED BY SURROGATE TRANSACTIONS
Most of the legal impediments to surrogate transactions are products of
state law. Although regulation of domestic relations and family matters is
92. Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 373, 384
(1981).
93. Brief for Appellant at 13, Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(A) (Repl. Vol. 1980).
95. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1975); CAL. CIv. CODE § 224(g) (West Supp. 1981); GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-418 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(1) (Baldwin 1969); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 210, § llA (Michie/Law. Co-op 1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.17 (Baldwin
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 866(4)-867 (West 1958 & 1981-82 Supp.); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.36.040-.060 (1976).
96. Letter, supra note 75, at 2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-196 (Repl. Vol. 1980). Other
states have similar statutes that require an intermediary to be licensed to place children for
adoption. See, e.g., MICH. CoM. LAWS ANN. § 722.124 (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REv. STAT. §
43-701 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 96-6 (West 1969); N.Y. Soc. SaRv. LAW § 374(2) (Mc-
Kinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-17 (Supp. 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.300 (1979).
97. Letter, supra note 75.
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generally left to the states,9 due consideration must always be given to
relevant constitutional guarantees. If the Constitution offers no special
protection, a state can regulate or even ban surrogate mother agreements
as long as it has a rational basis for such action.9 9 However, it seems argu-
able that surrogate transactions would be encompassed by the broad right
of privacy which the Supreme Court has found in relation to the family
and procreation.0 0 The Court has specifically recognized fundamental
rights to marry,' 0 ' procreate,10 2 not procreate, 0 3 raise children,' °4 and es-
tablish family living arrangements.0 5
The Supreme Court first protected the right to procreate in Skinner v.
Oklahoma,0 6 where it found: "[W]e are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procrea-
tion are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.' ' 0 7 In
Griswold v. Connecticut, the right to procreate was addressed in terms of
freedom from governmental intrusion.' The makers of the Constitution
were found to have "conferred as against the government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."' 09 Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, not only
98. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 15.3.
99. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (case involved restrictions on state fund-
ing of nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women); Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty. Rich-
mond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975), afl'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (applying rational basis test to
uphold statutes outlawing homosexuality).
100. Although unable to identify a constitutional provision which expressly creates such
privacy rights, the Supreme Court has found protection for certain "fundamental rights" in
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See
generally notes 101-25 infra and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry is fundamental;
therefore, state may not condition it upon meeting conditions of child support obligations);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's miscegenation statute struck as violative of
equal protection and due process).
102. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute requiring compulsory
sterilization of certain habitual criminal offenders violates equal protection).
103. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fundamental right to terminate preg-
nancy during first trimester); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (state cannot ban
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (statute prohibiting use of contraceptives held to violate marital privacy right).
104. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (combined rights of parental con-
trol in child-rearing and free exercise of religion outweigh state's interest in educating chil-
dren beyond eighth grade); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parents have
basic right to direct upbringing and education of child, and state cannot compel children to
attend public school).
105. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (mu-
nicipal zoning ordinance prohibiting extended family from occupying same dwelling is
unconstitutional).
106. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
107. Id. at 541.
108. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
109. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
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found that "the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family
are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically
protected"' 10 but also recognized the existence of a "private realm of fam-
ily life which the state cannot enter."'"
Later cases acknowledge that the right to procreate is not limited to
married persons or "sacred precincts." As was stated in Eisenstadt v.
Baird: "[I]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."'1 " In Roe v. Wade, which overturned a
state statute prohibiting abortions, the Supreme Court cited these earlier
cases as having established that the privacy right "has some extension to
activities relating to marriage, . . . procreation, . . .contraception,...
family relationships, and child rearing and education . ,,.18 Finally, in
Carey v. Population Services International,1 4 the Court spoke of "indi-
vidual autonomy in matters of childbearing," 15 and stated that "the
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individuals' deci-
sions in matters of child bearing from unjustified intrusion of the
state.M
6
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court's recognition of procreative
autonomy and the attendant restriction on state regulation of such mat-
ters is an umbrella broad enough to encompass surrogate mother agree-
ments. Any pronouncement on this subject would be mere speculation.
The cases addressing procreative rights have dealt primarily with the
election not to have a child. Contraceptives and abortions were the topics
discussed. 1 7 In contrast, surrogate agreements deal with the decision to
have a child. Different protection might be accorded to this right. Fur-
thermore, "privacy is a broad, abstract, and ambiguous concept which can
easily be shrunken in .meaning but also be interpreted as a Constitutional
bar to many things.' n Thus, the constitutional aspects of surrogate
agreements must await consideration by the Supreme Court.
Of course, even if surrogate transactions were held to be constitution-
ally protected, that would not preclude state regulation of surrogate
mother agreements. Aspects of fundamental rights such as marriage and
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
110. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
111. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
112. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
113. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citations omitted).
114. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
115. Id. at 687.
116. Id.
117. Brief, supra note 93, at 11.
118. 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
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procreation are the subject of laws.119 The state "makes rules to establish,
protect, and strengthen family life" when it is in the public interest.
120
Likewise the state possesses broad powers in the area of public health.' 2
As Roe, stated, there is no "unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases.' 22 However, when a fundamental right is involved, the state can
burden that right only when a compelling interest can be shown.' 2 Any
regulation must be reasonable"24 and must be drawn in a manner that
does not significantly interfere with the protected right."25
The states undoubtedly would have an interest sufficient to justify rea-
sonable regulations protecting the health of the surrogate and child. For
example, procedures for the documentation and administration of artifi-
cial insemination would be proper areas for state supervision. Adoption
statutes that are designed to protect the welfare and interest of the child
would also be applicable to surrogate agreements. Finally, a state could
also elect to pass new legislation that would allow the payment of fees to
surrogates. However, the state could place restrictions on the payment by
limiting the amount of the fee or requiring approval of sums paid.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether Sarah and Abram faced any legal repercussions from the ini-
tial surrogate mother arrangement is unrecorded. Even centuries later,
the legal consequences of such agreements are still questionable. Con-
tract, artificial insemination, illegitimacy, and adoption laws could be ap-
plied to surrogate mother agreements. In their respective areas, these
laws provide proper regulafions and remedies for the problems they were
designed to address. Yet, when these laws are applied to surrogate mother
119. All states set age limits and prevent parties from entering into more than one mar-
riage. "A State may not only 'significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship' but may in many circumstances absolutely prohibit it." Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 392 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the
Court upheld statutes for sterilization of inmates of state institutions afflicted with heredi-
tary mental defects or diseases.
120. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971) (intestate succession statute upheld
which subordinated rights of acknowledged illegitimate children to those of other relatives
of deceased parent).
121. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (patient identification as user of
dangerous drugs is reasonable exercise of state police power); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
154 (1973) (even though constitutional right of privacy includes right to have abortion, "the
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests"); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (compulsory vaccination within state's police
power, as is any other law safeguarding public health and safety "unless palpably in conflict
with the Constitution").
122. 410 U.S. at 154.
123. Id. at 155.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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agreements, they prove to be an impediment rather than a beneficial rem-
edy. Active recognition of this problem by an enlightened judiciary is the
immediate solution. The long term solution is legislation carefully drafted
with an awareness of the impact which future medical technology may
have on the concept of surrogate motherhood.
Margaret D. Townsend

